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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

UWRENCE

H.

ALL~NDINGER,

Case No.

14582

Defendant-Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
THE STATE'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF FAILS TO PERCEIVE THE
ISSUE IN THIS CASE THAT IN ABSENCE OF A LEGISLATIVE
MAXIMUM, PROBATION PERIODS FOR MISDEMEANORS IN UTAH
ARE LIMITED BY THE PERIOD OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE
OFFENSE IN QL~STION.
Appellant believes that the majority of the arguments presented
by respondent in its brief are answered by the original brief of
appellant in this case.

However, it is clear that respondent has

missed the thrust of the argument presented by appellant:

that because

t~e Utah legislature has not established a maximum limit for probation

in misdemeanor cases,

the maximum must be the period of incarceration

for the offense in question.

In support of this position, appellant citec

~n its original brief numerous cases which held that where no legislative

maximum for probation occurred, the probationary period was limited
by the period of incarceration established by the State legislature.
See Appellant's Brief op.

3-14.
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r.

but asserts they were overruled by subsequent legislative action.
example, respondent argues that "Kansas law now allows probation
for up to four times the maximum incarceration period.
In re Carroll, 91 KAN. 395, 137 P. 975 (1914) ".
overturned by legislative action."

. " and tha:

. has long since '::;

Respondent's Brief pp. 10-ll.

Appellant argues that respondent's phraseology is grossly misleading
In the Carrol case, the Kansas Supreme Court struggled with the :.sst<
in absence of a legislatively orescribed maximum or limit for oroba::
When, in 1947, the Kansas legislature provided such a law, the case
rule became moot, but it was not "overturned."

The Kansas Supreme

Court recognized a void in the law in 1914 and filled it with its
opinion in Carrol.
Court's opinion.

Subsequent legislation was in harmony with the
Rather than being overturned or reversed, Carrol

stands for the proposi:::.::::.
requires a maximum

1::.~~

-=~.c.-

::-:e concept of Due Process of La'"'

:_sat~on

just as it requires a

maxi~u=

limit for imprisonment; and that where the legislature has failed to
establish such a maximum limit, that limit will be determined b:r the
legislative limit on incarceration for the offense in question.
Respondent uses this same reasoning in misinterpreting
appellant's use of the Oklahoma case of Ex Parte Eaton, 29 OKLA
275, 233 p. 781 (1925).

CRIY

Respondent argues that because the Oklahoma

legislature acted and set a two year limit on misdemeanor probatior.
that Eaton does not apply to our situation.

Respondent's Brief p

Eaton like Carrol stands for the proposition that the judiciae.'

J1USt

move to fill the vacuum where a state legislature has not estdblishe~
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limits on probation; and further, that the judiciary should adopt the
statutory punishment limit as the probation limit.

The subsequent

enactment by the Oklahoma legislature does not affect this case as
being authority for appellant's proposition.
Respondent observes that the Idaho cases cited by appellant
involve felonies and then smugly dismisses them as "obviously not
authority for appellant's position" (sic) Respondent's Brief p. 12.
Idaho's statute is virtually identical to Utah's (Appellant's Brief
p. 5) and the Idaho Supreme Court observed in two different cases that
where no statutory maximum for probation is prescribed, the maximum
is determined by the penalty for the offense

Respondent does not

explain and appellant does not understand how the fact that felonies
were involved can alter that principle developed by our sister state,
and appellant urges this Court to reject that sort of unsupported
assertion.
Respondent asks this Court to reject the case of People v.
Blakeman, 170 Ca. 2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (1959) because it involved a
case where the trial judge failed to set a limit, not where a statutory
limit was lacking.

Although correct, respondent fails to grasp the

principle reiterated by the California Court that "when the probationary
period is not specified it is deemed to be for the maximum possible
period of imprisonment."
p

339 P. 2d at 204.

And see Appellant's Brief

8.

Respondent cites the United States Supreme Court case of
Prank v. Cnited States, 395 U.S. 147, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162, 89 S. Ct.
1503 (1969) for the proposition that probation periods can be longer
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than maximum periods for incarceration.
the thrust of appellant's argument.

Again respondent misses

Mr. Justice Marshall, in the

segment of his opinion quoted by respondent at page 6 of its brief,
points out that a federal

statute specifically provides for a longer

period of probation than the period of imprisonment.

§3653.

See 18 L'.S.C.

The Frank case therefore, does not address itself to the

issue involved in the instant appeal because no legislative vacuum,
such as exists in Utah, exists in the federal system.
Finally, respondent cites the American Bar Association's
Standards for Criminal Justice as authority for the proposition that
probation terms may be longer than jail terms.

Respondent states

"The American Bar Assoc:..ac::..::m s·..:ggests two years probation for a
misdemeanor and up t:c
Respondent has

:=~

-

misconst~ueG

c

:-

-o.

:'elony".

Respondents brief page -

and overlooked the American Bar Associa::

true position on the question.

The sub-section referred to by

respondent reads in its entirety as follows:
"(d) The court should specify at the time of sentencing
the length of any term during which the defendant is to
be supervised and during which the court will retain powe~
to revoke the sentence for the violation of specified
conditions. Neither supervision nor the power to
revoke should be permitted to extend beyond a legislativel:'
fixed time, which should in no event exceed two years
for a misdemeanor or five years for a felony."
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice Standards Re~ating
to Probation, Approved Draft 1970, §1:1
It should be clear that rather than recommending :·do ?ears
probation for a misdemeanor and five years for a felony, the Stan~
urge an absolute maximum of those terms.

Mast important f•:Jr purp05 2 '

of this
appeal however, is the fact that the Standards urse :hat
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probation not be allowed
to extend
beyond
a legislativel? fixed

maximum.

It is clear that the American Bar Association Standards

fully support appellant's position that all states should have such
a legislative maximum.
state legislatures.

What that maximum is should be up to the

However, where the legislature has not

established such a maximum period for probation, appellant urges
this court to accept the uncontradicted weight of authority and fill
the void by limiting probation to the maximum period for
incarceration.
It may very well be that if the Utah legislature acts on
this issue they would adopt the positions of other Western States
and legislatively establish the limit for probation as being the
same as the limit for incarceration.
~owever,

is immaterial to this appeal.

Whether or not that happens,
The fact is, a legislative

void exists which must be filled by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has failed to cite a single authority which
refutes appellant's position that where no maximum period for
~robation

is fixed £y the legislature, the maximum should be the

same as the limit for incarceration.

Subsequent legislative action

?ursuant to the numerous court decisions which stand for that
Jrcposition, have in no way affected the proposition even though
~hat

respective legislature may have chosen to make the maximums

different.

There seems to be no conflict among the authorities that
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such a maximum period for probation is a necessity to our precepts
of Due Process of Law.

In our sister state Idaho, whose statute

was almost exactly the same as ours, the Idaho
established the position taken by appellant.
Association Standards
and virtually

eve~

Supre~e

Court

The American Bar

support the necessity for such a maximum

court which has moved to establish a maximum

where a legislative void existed has used the maximum period of
incarceration as the standard.

Appellant strongly urges this Court

to follow the great weight of authority and established logic and
adopt the same standard.
DATED this

~day

of September, 1976.
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